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Introduction
Reformofthebussectorinmanycountrieshasfocussedonalte rnativeservice deliveryregimessuchascompetitivetendering 3 andperformance-basedquality contracts (see,forexample,HensherandStanley[2003] andPre stonandvande Velde[2002] fordetails).Twoissuesthatarisewhendetailingspecificreformstrategiesarethegeographicaldefinitionoftheservicearea(ore venwhetheritisa single route as in London) and the flow-through implications of service quality initiativessuchasintegratedfares. 4 Thelatterrelatestotheabilityofapassengerto travelbetweenpublictransportmodesandoperatorsonasingle fareaswellas potentiallyofferingtimesavings.
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Indevelopinganimplementationplanforperformance-basedcont racts(suchas theonedevelopedbyHensherandHoughton [2003] ),anumberof commentators have raised the question of how many contracts should best be provided within a particular geographical setting. Should we take the ex isting contracts (and areas) or rationalize the contracts to a smaller number? A rguments proposedforfewercontractareasaremainlyrelatedtoadministra tivecoherenceand passenger benefits from network integration. A concern with few er contracts (dependingonthemeaningoffewer)isthepotentiallossof internalefficiency andthehighriskofmonopolypowerand/ormarketdominance,wi thresultant pressuresongovernmenttoincreasesubsidiesbeyondwhatcurre ntlyexistand/ orareinanysenseoptimal.
Thisarticleexaminestheargumentsforandagainstarangeof reforminitiatives associatedwiththedeterminationofthegeographicalsizeofc ontractareas,as wellasrevenueallocationandpatronagebenefitissueslinked tointegratedfares associated with cross-contract service delivery. Although the article focuses on Australia(Sydneyinparticular),andtoalesserextentEurope ,toillustratesomeof theevidence,theargumentspresentedareofrelevanceuniversa llyandareespeciallyusefulfortheUnitedStates,whichappearstolagbehin dthereformprogramsofEuropeandAustralia. TheStateTransitAuthorityofNewSouthWales(STA),thegovernment-owned operator,isthelargestoperatorwith26contractsandrunsthepublicbusnet-workwhichcoversalmosthalfofSydney(1.61.8millionpopula tion,nearly800 squarekilometres,and1,750busesoperatingoutof11depots) centeredonthe SydneyCBD(SeeFigure1).Ithasmanyadjacentcontractareas sothatitsservices arenotdeliveredonacontractareabasisperse,operatingas oneverylargeprovider.TheSTAhasdesignedaroutenetworkofservicesthattakespassengersto keycentersacrossaregion,notjustwithinthecontractarea. Thisnetworkeconomy isachieved,however,atarelativelyhighinternalinefficienc ycostof$4.86perbus kilometer 11 (incontrasttothebestpracticecostof$2.60/buskilometerf orprivate operatorswhocurrentlyhave53contractsamong30operators). Theimportant questionhereinistheextenttowhichthecross-contractarea serviceprovision hascontributedtothesehigherunitcostsorwhetheritisthe productofgovernmentownershipandspecificrestrictionsofservicedelivery.Partcanbeattributed toexternalitiessuchastrafficcongestion.BasedontheSTAsoperationsoutsideof theSydneyMetropolitanArea(inNewcastle,aregionalCenter1 20kmsfromSydney withapopulationofabout500,000),wecouldreducethe$4.86 to$3.54 (Daniels 2002) . However internal inefficiency must account for much of t he remaining incrementabove$2.60.
Figure 1. The Sydney Metropolitan Area and the STA Contract Area
The literature on industrial organization from which ideas cent ral to tendering evolvedsuchasprincipal-agentrelationships,transactionscos ts,andeconomies ofscaleandscope,putsforwardcompellingargumentsthatmany ofthegainsin service delivery to the market can be effected through preserva tion of smaller effectivemanagementunitsworkingwithinarangeofalliances tructures,where eachallianceisestablishedtobestaccommodatetheinterests ofthemarket(i.e., customers)andtheinterestsofthesupplyingstakeholders(see HayandVickers [1987] and Williamson [1987] ). To assume that one large organization with a singlelargecontractarea(orevenafewunderanoligopoly)isthebestwayforwardinservicingthemarketisquestionable.Itassumesthatt hetransactionscosts betweenoperatorsandcustomersareexcessiveandthetransacti onscostswithin anorganizationarenonexistentorminimal 12 . Indeed the literature on the economictheoryofregulation(orcapturetheory)describeshowregulatoryagencies may end up more or less in the pocket of those whom they p urport to regulate.Theresponseinsomeindustrieshasbeenthedismantl ingofsuchregulatory frameworks through economic deregulation (e.g., airlines , telecommunications),withareplacedregulatoryregimefocusedonmonitori ng.
Thereisananalogousliteraturearguingforlocalspecializati onandalliancesinsteadoftheformationoflarge,single-entitybusinesses.Inde ed,itdoesnottake longbeforeweseemanyoftheverylargeentitiesessentially operatingasasetof separate entities with occasional cross-subsidy to facilitate short-run (at least) viabilityacrosstheentiresetoforganizationsundertheone control.Thisbreeds inefficiency(likegovernmentsbailingouttheirownpublicmon opolies)andupward pressures on subsidy support from government. As Preston a nd van de Velde (2002) state governments caving in to operators suffering from the winners curse or generally finding life tough was a real threat to competitive tenderinginsomecountriesandsituations.
Fundamentally, the reduction in the number of contract areas runs the risk of furtherpromotingdominanceandafurthermoveawayfromtheid ealsofcompetitionpolicy. 13 Itisadangerousmoveifiterodesthecompetitivebaseofthebus marketinthesensethatitreducestheabilitytopromoteand maintainaprocess ofeffectiveorpotentialcompetitionsoastoachieveamoree fficientallocationof resources.
14 Inlargemeasure,wehavetoputtothetestthecasethatsuc hamalgamations deliver additional benefits that more than outweigh t he additional costs.
Howeveralliancesdonotjusthappen.Themarketmaywellsend signalstoencouragesuchalliancesbutthereisnoguaranteethatthesigna lswillberegistered andactedupon.Toensuremarketsignalactivation,appropriateinformationand incentives needtobeputinplace.Government,through itsregulatoryagency, canmakeamajorcontributiontothisprocess.Inthepresenceofimperfectinformation,signalingandincentivesystemsareatthecenterstage.Todateinmost internationalsettingswhereregulatoryreformisactive,thereislittleevidenceof alliances (although see Norway in the next paragraph), which is disappointing, butthismaywellbeexplainedbythestrategicintentofthen ew(global)players andthelackofincentivesinthepast.Theevolutionofallian ceswillrequiremuch moreincentive-driveninitiativesbytheregulatorespeciallyw herethereisalossof internal efficiency due to the scale of operations. There is no denying that this happens, but what is important is the size of an operator beyon d which such internal efficiencies come into play. In Sydney, for example, where most recent purchasesinvolveoperatorscontrollingmorethan100buses,th eseareworrying signals(seeevidencebelow).
There is an interesting history of cooperation and merger in Be rgen, Norway (Carlquist2002).Althoughamergerattemptbetweenthetwomaj oroperators failedintheearly1990s,itledtosubstantialrouteandfare cooperation.In1998a new merger attempt succeeded. Furthermore, all bus companies in the region alreadycooperatedinanallianceregardingelectronicticketin gfarecoordination andpurchasing.Itwas,therefore,easyfortheregionalpublic transportauthority toimposearequirementforintegratedfaresintheperformance contract,initiatedin2000.Theoperatorswereobligedtohaveacommonticke tingsystemand fare tariff, but there is no limit to the upper fare level. The re is no evidence to support(orfalsify)theexistenceofnewpatronageattractionorincreasedbenefits toexistingpassengers,althoughCarlquist(2002)suggeststhat thelatterismore likelythantheformer.Ineithercase,itwouldbedifficulttohypothesisethata successfulintegrationwasduetoregulatoryintervention,asasuccessfulalliance betweentheoperatorsalreadyexisted.
Whether by amalgamation of ownership or alliance formation, the se are both mergerphenomenon.Forexample,combiningthreecontractareas intoonearea isa(horizontal)mergerandshouldbeassessedalongthesame linesasthemerger oftwoorganizations.Ifthereareeconomiesofscale(forthe exactsameservice type),thenthereareefficiencygains.Therealizationofthesegains,however,could beoffsetbywelfarelossesduetoreducedcompetition,beita ctualoryardstick,in the case of either competitive tendering or performance-based c ontracts (the latterduringthecontractperiodincompetingforincentivepa yments,theformer atthetimeofbidding).DeBorgerandKerstens(2000)reviewth eevidenceand conclude overall that there are no economies of scale but mild economies of scope associated with demand complementarities where the eviden ce suggests spatialdemandexistsbeyondcontract/operatorareas.Thelatte risanempirical issue.ItisinvestigatedbelowforSydneywherethereisverylittleintercontractarea use of public transport but opportunities for cross-regional se rvices capable of beingdeliveredefficientlybyasingleoperator.Indeed,asorganizationsincreasein size,theylosetherelativeprecisionrequiredtoestablishth evalueofspecificactivities;incontrast,throughalliancesthereismuchmoreprecisionandtransparency. AsynthesisofsomekeythemesisgiveninTable1. Inconsideringtheappropriatesizeoftheservicedeliveryuni t(SDU),thecostsof transactionareveryimportant.Thesecostsarenotlimitedto theinterfirmenvironment (which would include integrated fares and servicing of an interconnectednetwork)butincludethecostsoutlaidwithinafirm.An issueofrelevance in achieving the efficiency and network benefits is the reveali ng of information throughappropriatesignals(eitherfromthemarketorbyther egulator)toensurethatthebestinformationisactedupontodeliverservice stothemarketat costefficientandeffectivelevelsthat,withinasubsidy-depe ndentenvironment, delivers best value for money (in an efficiency and equity sens e) for the scarce subsidy dollar.
Looking at the internal efficiency of an SDU, the evidence from the published literaturesupportstheviewthattherearenoscaleeconomies (over100buses) 17 but mild network economies. 18 The latter translates in particular into an argument for having fewer (or even one) SDU operating a network-bas ed crossregional service, since the argued benefits to passengers are g reater than if the cross-regional services were provided by more than one operator. The assumptionimplicitinthisevidenceisthatpassengerswouldhaveto transferbetween modes(orbusoperators)tocompletetheirjourney.Thesenetwo rkeconomies arerelativelyweakwherecross-regionalservicesareshownto bedeliverableby smaller operators who move through other contract areas or wher e, through contractareaalliancesforspecificroutes,theycanpickupa nddropoffpassengers anywherealongtheroute.
AgoodexampleinSydneyoftheformeristheprivateoperator,ForestCoaches, who has a service from St. Ives/Chatswood (20 kms north of the city in a very wealthyarea)tothecity;agoodexampleofthelatteristhe 35kmorbitalservice about5kmsoutfromtheCBDinPerth(WesternAustralia)operatedthroughan allianceofthreeoperators.Thislastexampleisequivalentto whatAdelaide(South Australia) would refer to as a route-specific contract across contract areas (see Appendix2).Creatingamonopolysuppliertodeliverthemildn etworkeconomiesisfalseeconomysinceitwillalmostdefinitelyleadtom ajorlossesininternal efficiency.Rather,giventheevidencefromtheTransportDataCentre(TDC)ofthe NSW government that the majority of travel in Sydney occurs loc ally 19 (mainly withinonecontractareabutalsobetweentwoadjacentcontractareas),typically over80percentofalltrips(oftenwithinasinglecontractar eausingabusservice locallyortoaccessarailinterchange),theriskofdeliverin ghighlyexpensivelocal servicestothemajorityofusersjusttosatisfyaclaimonne tworkeconomiesfora smallamountofpatronageservicedeliveryispooreconomics.I ndeed,encouraging longer trips by any form of transport seems inconsistent wi th a desire to curtailtravelandpromotemorelocalactivity.
Animportantmessagefromtheinstitutionaleconomicsliteratureisthatweshould focusonefficiencyandnotmarketpower(theconcernwithredu cingthenumberofcontractareas);andweshouldnotaggregateoperatorso rcontractareas justtogainnetworkbenefitsinsituationswheremostofthese benefitsarewithin anexistingcontractareainthemain.Throughrecognitionofm arketopportunities (using appropriate signalling methods to reveal and share information and hencereduceinformationasymmetry)createdbypartnershipsbet weenalloperatorsandgovernment(viatheregulator),andtheformationofo peratoralliances toservespecialisedcross-regionalmarketniches,themajortr ansactioncosts(e.g., information asymmetry) appear to be more than offset by the hug e gains in internalefficiencyassociatedwithoperatorswithcontractsinthe30to100fleet-sizerange.Importantly,anindividualoperatormayhavemorethanonecontract (asmanydo),buttherearesensibleargumentstosupportthem aintenanceof eachcontractasaseparatebusinesscenter.Largeoperations,suchasmanyAsianbasedbusbusinesses(e.g.,inHongKong),mightbenefitbyreviewingtheirstructuresandmayreducethegrowinglevelsofsubsidysupportthat ,inpart,funds inefficiencies. Interconnectivity involving more than one bus operator in Sydne y is negligible (evenifonearguesthisisduetorelativelypoorexistingint erconnectivity)andis unlikelytobeofconcerntomostofthetravelingpopulation. Whileitmightbe arguedthatthenatureoftheexistingnetworkofservicesdeni esthisopportunity (andcertainlythecounterfactualsarenotavailable),ifsuch networkconnectivity weretobeprovidedandwouldincreasepatronage,theissueof relevancehereis whethercross-regionalandlong-haulmetropolitanservicescan beachievedunderexistingareacontractsbyappropriateallianceswhichpreservetheefficiencies ofeachoperator(includingtransactioncostadvantages).
Therecentgrowthincross-regionalservicesinSydneybypriva teoperatorswithouttransfersdemonstratesoneusefulcounter-factualinwhich apassengercan travel on a single-mode/single-operator service without transfe rs over long distanceswithintheSydneyMetropolitanarea(to/fromtheCBDwhi chisnotowned byasinglecontractandanopen-accessservicezone).ExamplesincludetheWestbus M2andHillsservices(inthenorthwest),HarrisParkCitybus( fromParramattain thewest),andForestCoachesSt.Ives/Chatswood-Cityservice( inthenorth),allof which serve the outer suburbs and deliver passengers into the C BD (see Figure  1) . 21 SimilarexamplesexistfortheSTAexceptthatmanyoftheSTAservicesare acrosscontractareasbelongingtotheSTAenablingpickupanddropoffacross the contract areas (although one might argue that strictly this is violating the termsofacontract).Theneedforintegratedfaresintheseex amples(wherepublic transport is showing evidence of serious competition with the c ar) is not relevant.
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Integratedfaresareaformofregulatoryinterventionifimpos edonalloperators fromabovesinceallmustconformtothegrandplan.AsHibbs ( 2000)hasindicated,constructsofintegration(ofwhichintegratedfaresare anexample)leadto aweakeningofbotheffectivenessandefficiency.Itdeniesindividualoperatorsor groupsofoperatorsthefullabilitytoberesponsivetomarket opportunitiesin ways that are consistent with delivering the appropriate servic es to customers. Again,Hibbsandothersarguethatotherthantheregardforsa fetyandissuesof scale and power, public passenger transport is a market-based, customer-driver activity and especially with regard to its relationship with the private car, from wheremostofitscompetitioncomes.Integratedfaresdictated acrosstheboard maywellbeinequitableaswellasaninefficientwayofsecuri ngoptimumsocial benefit.
23 Market-based fares policies designed to benefit users are need ed, and thebesttestofthisisthelevelsofpatronageresultingfromthepolicy.Ifaspecific arrangementoralliancebetweenoperatorsinaparticularpubli ctransportchain seesmeritinintegratedfares,thenthisshouldbesupported, butnotasacarte blanche,no-choicepolicy.Theone-size-fits-allphilosophyisverydangerousand counterproductive.
What Is the Broader Evidence on Patronage Benefits?
Thematterofintegratedfaresandimpactsonpatronageisnotwellstudied.There arevirtuallynopublishedpapersonthetopicthatmaketheli nkclearandunambiguous.Thatis,unlessonecanseparateoutalltheothercha ngesthatarehappeningatthesametime(e.g.,farediscounting), 24 itisnotpossibletomakeany sensible statements on the specific contribution of integrated/ intermodal/ interoperator fares.
Inreviewingtheliteraturewehavefoundanumberofcomments thatstatethat intermodal fares are often inappropriate where one has mainly m ode-specific travel.Thatis,mostcircumstanceswherethetopicismentioned,talkaboutlimitedmodalswitching(i.e.,railtobus)andfocusonsingle-mo dediscountedfares andotherdeals(includingthegrowinginterestinmultipurpose faremediathat enableonetouseasmartcardonbuses,shopping,cinemas).The examplesnever refertosmartcardsfortravelingonbusesandtrains,whichis interestingbyits absence.
ThestudiesinAppendix1arebasedonaliteraturereviewbyB oozAllanHamilton (BAH)in2002.Mostarequestionable.Forexample,oneoftheb etterstudiesby London Transport (Fairhurst 1993) found that the introduction of Travelcards boostedpassengermilesinthefirstyearby3.83percentisba sedonveryaggregatedtimeseriesdata.Wequestionwhatothercontrolvariableswereincluded. ThepaperbyFooteandDarwin(2001)forChicagoconcludesthat a3.6percent increaseinridershipoverayearwhenAFCwasintroducedisattributedtomany factorsbutmostisattributedtofarepolicieswithinasingle mode(whichismore reflectiveofwherethemarketis).Theoverallgrowthimpact( i.e.,newtrips)ofall sources of fare changes is maximally 30 percent of 3.6 percent or 1.08 percent. Clearlymuchlessthan10percentsuggestedbytheBAHreview.
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TheDutchrail-taxicombinationintroducedin2000isanothere xampleofintegration of two modes. One cannot infer anything about patronage growth because the new taxi services provided were rather different from those of the ordinarytaxis.Thetrain-taxishavealowerqualityofservice .Withmorepassengers per taxi, one may have to wait at the railway station. Another example is the introductionofthestandardizednationwidebus/tram/metrotick etintheNetherlandsinthe1970s,enablingpassengerstousethesameticke tirrespectiveofthe modeorthecompanyprovidingtheservices.Nomonitoringwasu ndertakenon theeffectsofitsintroductionatthattime.Suchchangestendnotonlytoencourageintegrationbutalsoproduceadifferentpricestructure.
Conclusions
Theargumentsandevidencepresentedinthisarticlesuggestth attheperceived gainsfromthereductioninthenumberofcontractareasarelikelytobeillusory. Ifthegainsinnetworkeconomiesarenotsufficientlylargeto outweighanylikely lossofinternalefficiency,thereisacaseforamalgamatingcontractareastoensure thatlocalservicesarenothamperedbycross-contractareacon straintsonservice delivery.Giventhemajorfocusonlocalserviceprovision,opportunitiestodeliver appropriatecross-regionalandcross-networkservicescanberevealedandpromotedbypartnershipsbetweenbusoperatorsandtheregulator.
Amechanismbywhichtheappropriatemarketsignalsarecapture dandmade availabletoallrelevantparties(i.e.,thereleaseofinforma tion)isrequired.Integrated fares as one instrument to promote network public transp ort activity, whilehavingsomemerit,areunlikelytobeamajorinfluenceo nthetake-uprate ofcross-regionalnetworkservicessincetheyarebestsupplied asasinglemodal service through an alliance or agreement for a single operator to deliver crosscontractroute-specificserviceswheretransfersareminimised ifnoteliminated. Thenandonlythenmightwehaveachanceoftakingsometraffi cfromthecar market.
Appendix 1. Impact of Fares and Ticketing Integration on Patronage International Case Studies Source:BoozAllanHamiltonReview2002 London
As part of a number of initiatives to increase public transport use, multimodal Travelcardswereintroducedforbusandundergroundservicesduringearly1983. RailwaslaterincludedintheschemewiththemergingofTravelcardandCapitalcard during1989. Fairhurst(1993) soughttoseparatelyisolatepatr onageimpactsfrom changesinfaresandfaresintegration.Thefirstyearimpactf romfaresintegration was significant with passenger miles increasing around 18 perce nt on buses, 28 percentonundergroundservices,and24percentoverall.
Paris
Inmid1975,theOrangeCardwasintroducedintheParisregi on.Thecardisa nontransferable,monthly(oryearly)seasonticketthatcanbe usedondifferent transportmodesincludingbus,themetro,suburbantrain,andv ariousoperator networks(i.e.,RER,SNCF,APTR).TheOrangeCardhashadasignificanteffecton patronagealthoughtheimpactsonbusandmetroserviceshavebeendisproportionate.
NewYork
AmajorchangeinticketingoccurredinNewYorkduring1997withtheintroduc-tionoftheMetroCard.Astoredvaluecard,theMetroCardcanbeusedonthe busandthesubwayandisacceptedbyalloperators.TheMetroC ardhadasignificant effect on patronage, particularly buses. Between July 1996 and July 1997, averageweekdaybusridershipincreased16.9percentandaverag eweekendbus ridershipincreased20.2percent.Theeffectsonthesubwaywer elessmarked,with weekdaysubwayridershipincreasingby2.6percent.Overallrid ershiplevelswere attheirhighestsince1971(Walker1997).
Zurich
Priortotheintroductionofintegratedticketing,Zurichwasc haracterizedbyan exceptionallyhighlevelofpublictransportuse.Scheduleswer ecoordinatedona voluntarybasiswitheachoperatorhavingitsownfares.
After the formation of the Zurcher Verkenrsverbund (ZVV), a comprehensive integratedfareandticketingsystemwasintroduced.Thisinvol vedthefullcoordi-nationofservicesandthedevelopmentofasinglefaresystembasedonzonalfares. Thecombinationofthesetwofactorsincreasedoverallpatronag ebyanaverage 12 percent in the first twp years of operation, with significan t increases of 53 percentand30percentforfeederbusesandheavyrailrespecti vely(Laube1995).
Surrey
SurreyCountyCouncilhasmadesignificantinvestmentsinsever alpublictransportschemesincludingtheTravelwideticketinWoking.Usersurveyswereconductedtoevaluatetheperformanceofsuchschemes.Surveysrev ealedthatthe Travelwide ticket had little effect on patronage in terms of take-up by existing users(i.e.,lessthan2%ofbususershadusedtheTravelwideticket).TheTravelwide tickethadlimitedsuccessingeneratingnewbusjourneys.Overall,thestudyconcludedthatthemultiplejourneyTravelwidetickethadanegligibleeffectonpatronage (unknown author).
LosAngeles
Interoperatortransfersaccountedforlessthan0.5percentoftotalregionalrides priortothegrowthoffaresandserviceintegration.Asservic eandfaresintegration grew, the number of passengers making multioperator trips increased. By 1994thenumberofmultioperatortripshadincreased2percent (i.e.,11million boardingsperyear)(CarterandPollen1994).
Chicago
AChicagostudyestimatedthatridershipwouldincreasebetween 2to5percent as a result of the introduction of automated fare collection sy stems (Dinning 1996 Oneproblemwiththebusindustrymaybethatthelackofexper ienceinmanagingchangeand/orthereticenceinbeinginnovativegivenahis toryofsuppression of innovation is hampering the speed of taking up opportunities waiting for action.Generationalinheritance,forexample,whichoftenlack sanunderstandingoftheneedtosustainwealthandsurvivalleadstoareductioninentrepreneurialactivityandhenceadeclineinanypotentialinnovation. 10 The winners curse exists when the winning operator discovers after winning thatithasoverpaidgiventherealvalueofthetender.
11 Allcostsarein$AUD,with$AUD1.0approximatelyequalto$U.S.0.59.
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Theinternalefficiencyofanorganizationdependsonthedegre eofcompetition itfacesinsofarascompetitionaffectsmanagerialincentives andopportunities. Onewaythatcompetitionsharpensincentives,andhenceinternalefficiency,isby permitting the relative performance of agents to be compared. B enchmarking runstherealriskofbeinglostwithaveryfewoperators. 13 InOslothereiscurrentlydiscussionaboutthecontractsizef orthefuturebus tenders.Theauthorityhasclearlystatedthatoperatorsshould begivenfinancial incentives for passenger growth and service quality, and performance contract principles should be applied. The problem here is that there ar e two principalagentrelationships.Firstly,therewillbeacontractbetweenthecityandthemunicipal company (Oslo Sporveier) that serves as the public tran sport executive (PTE).Thiswillbeanetwork-widenetcontractthatwillnotb etendered.Previously,thisrelationwassubjecttoaperformance-basedsubsidy,butthishasbeen discontinued.Secondly,therewillbetenderedsubcontractsforvariouspackages. Thesearethecontractsforwhichperformance-basedprinciples willbeapplied. (Bothnetandgrosscontractsarecurrentlyinusefortheseop erations,buttenderinghasnotyetcommenced.)Toensureasufficientnumberofcompetitors,it isexpectedthatthePTEwillwanttorestrictthesizeofcontractareas.Inpractice thiswillmeanthatthetenderpackageswillconsistofasmall numberofroutes. TheOslonetworkiscomplexandroutescrisscrossalloverthecity.Consequently, itmaybedifficulttoimplementnet-costcontracts,atleastwithoutasophisticatedrevenueallocationsystem.Thealternativeisagross-cos tsystemwithquality incentives,butthatissomethingdifferentfromtheHordaland typemodel,which requiresanet-costcontract. 14 Althoughnotspecificallyrelatedtonumberofoperators,thei ssueofwhoowns whatisveryimportantindeterminingeconomicefficiencyinservicedelivery.Operatingfranchises,suchasthoseinAdelaidethatseparateinvestmentfromoperatingdecisions,areboundtoresultinresourcemisallocation,manifestedbyovercapitalization and the production of dispensable and underutili zed services (Berechman 1993:294) . Apart from the diverse goals of the owner of the assets (i.e.,publicsector)whopromotesocialwelfareoutcomesinco ntrasttothecommercialoutcomesoftheoperator,thegovernmentandoperatordisproportion-atelysharetheoverallrisksincethebulkoftheriskassocia tedwithcapitalinvestment(notablythefleet)isassumedbygovernment.Withtheris kofovercapitalizationgreaterthanundersingleownership(andasinglecomme rcialobjective), thelossofeconomicefficiencyisveryreal,exacerbatedifth eoperatorengagesin higherriskprojectsthanitwouldotherwisedosoifitcarrie dthefullrisk.Thisrisk can, in part, be circumvented by monitoring but at a much highe r level that wouldberequirediftheoperatorcarriedalltherisk.Itisd oubtfulthatthegovernment would be able to acquire all the necessary information on costs and demandwithoutoutlayingalotofresources.Transactionscostsarelikelytoraise questionsaboutthevalueofthisapproachtoservicedelivery.Underrisk-sharing thenotionthatbiddersareexpectedtobeartheentireriskst emmingfrominvestmentandoperationaldecisions,withthefacevalueoftheirbi dsservingasasound predictoroftheirexpectedperformance,evaporates. 15 Ifcostsofhavingaprivatefirmsupplytheservicescouldbe reducedbymeans ofanegotiatedcontract,theconsiderablecostsoforganizing acompetitivebiddingwouldbeaverted.Indeedacompetitivetenderingschemem ightinsome cases be inferiortomethodsofcontractrenewalornegotiation (Berechman, 1993, 29899) 16 Within the Sydney metropolitan area, private bus operators are some of the mostcostefficientintheworld.Consequently,competitivetenderingisveryunlikelytodeliverfinancialbenefit.
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Thereisacaseforeconomiesofscaleinmovingfromaverysm alloperationsuch as1to4busesuptoabout30buses,butovertherange30to 100weseealmost constant returns to scale with decreasing returns to scale over 100 buses (Berechman1993andpersonalcommunication(July11,2002 withKjellJansson, Sweden). Fleet size is an appropriate indicator of scale, being highly correlated withothercontenderssuchaspopulationpersquarekilometer( acorrelationof 0.886fortheSTAcontractareas).Otherindicatorssuchasarea(insqkms)hasa simplecorrelationof0.80forSTAareas.
18 TheSydney2000Olympicsprovidedvaluableevidenceonthisma tter (Hensher andBrewer2003) .Thedepotsetuptocoordinatebusservicesa ccommodated morethan1,000buses,substantiallylargerthanthelargestde potinSydneyunder normalconditions(anSTAdepotwith250buses).Inhindsight,itwasconcluded that major internal efficiencies could have been obtained by ha ving a series of smallerdepotsupto150buses.
19 Wewouldarguethatthisiscommoninmostlargemetropolitanareas.
20.
ResearchbyAlsnihandHensher (2003)suggeststhatseniorsand theelderly (i.e.,individualsover55yearsold)arelessinclinedtouse publictransportwhere transfersarerequired.
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Examplesofcross-regionalservicesinthetextareveryweakb ecausetheydonot involvepickingupanddroppingoffinmorethanonecontracta rea.(TheCBDof Sydneyisnotacontractarea.)Thisabilitydoesnotexistamo ngprivateoperators inSydneybecauseoftheexistingcontractrequirements.Itis suggestedthatthe governmentoperator(StateTransit)hastruecross-regionalservicessuchasRoute 400(BurwoodtoBondiJunction),Route370(CoogeetoLeichhard t),andRoute L20(CitytoParramatta).Privateoperatorshavenottodatede velopedstrategic alliancestopickupanddropoffinmorethanoneoperatorsarea,denyingthemselvesofalliancerevenue. 22 Althoughtheautomated fare collection (AFC) system of theSTA shows that one in five boardings is made by a Travelpass ticket of which 66 percent are a train+bus+ferryticketand32percentareabus-ferryticket(w ithonly3%being busonly),itisunclearastowhethertheticketpurchaseract uallyusesmorethan onemodeorissimplytakingadvantageoftheattractivediscou ntsoffered.For example,theaveragediscountonTravelpassesisbetween27and 36percent. 23 Theinequityislikelytoarisefromcross-subsidytotherelat ivelywealthiertravelerswhotendtoundertakethelongertrips. 24 The introduction of integrated fares is often in conjunction wi th other measures,suchasincreasedmarketingbudgetstopushthenewtick etingandpromoting bus travel, better information systems, increased bus fr equencies and discountstofares.Increaseddiscountingwouldbeafeatureof manyintegrated ticketingexercisesandwouldhaveanimpactonridership. 25 Onerefereesuggested,Theappendicesdefinitelydemonstratei ncreasedridershipincasesoffareintegration.Whilenotdenyingtheabsoluteevidence,thetext arguesthatthecontributionoffareintegrationtothepatrona geincreasesisby nomeansclearandthatotherfactorshaveplayedarole.Wesu pportamuchmore carefullyconstructedempiricalstudytoestablishthewidersetofinfluenceson patronageincreasesratherthancredititalltofaresintegrat ion.
